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Abstract
The relationship between policy-making and strategic intelligence is a
source of ongoing discourse. Although there is an abundance of
literature about the relationship between consumers and producers of
intelligence, consensus as to the relationship between policy makers and
intelligence producers is lacking. The two concepts–proximity and
politicization–represent the intelligence dilemma that leads to claims of
politicization, a word with many interpretations. Most observers of the
democratic policy-making process are familiar with the traditional
potential sources of politicization yet those sources are not the only
potential sources of politicization and there is a paucity of literature
about external influences and the politicization of intelligence. In
democracies, governed by the people through their elected
representatives, many individuals and groups interact with policymakers
to influence decisions. This article provides a framework for
understanding sources of politicization external to the intelligence
community. It identifies an outside-in influence and uses three examples
to show how this type of stimulus contributes to the politicization of
intelligence.
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Introduction 
One of the more thought-provoking aspects of politics is the relationship 
between policy-making and strategic intelligence. There is an abundance of 
literature and a variety of opinions about the proper relationship between 
policymakers, who are consumers of intelligence, and producers of 
intelligence, who turn raw data into reports to inform policy-making.1 
However, there is a paucity of literature exploring sources of politicization 
from outside the Intelligence Community (IC), which is necessary to round 
out the discourse. Indeed, recent news headlines warn about intelligence 
politicization as the executive branch and the United States Intelligence 
Community spar publicly over analytic conclusions reached by the IC.2 
 
For decades, the center of the discourse about politicization was proximity–
how close or far apart should consumers and producers operate? The 
question arose because, as in all relationships, frequent and repeated 
interactions can be an asset just as much as those interactions can become 
problematic. Likewise, amongst scholars and practitioners, there was “no 
consensus as to what the relationship between intelligence and policy should 
                                                 
1 Uri Bar-Joseph, “The Politicization Of Intelligence: A Comparative Study,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26:2 (2013): 347-369, 
doi:10.1080/08850607.2013.758000; Richard K. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence 
Costs and Benefits,” in Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael 
I. Handel, eds. Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken (London: Frank Kass, 2003), 
57-76, available at: 
http://people.exeter.ac.uk/mm394/Richard%20Betts%20Paradoxes%20of%20Intellige
nce%20Essays%20in%20Honor%20of%20Michael%20I.%20Handel%20%202003.pdf; 
Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National 
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Robert M. Gates, “Guarding 
Against Politicization,” Studies in Intelligence 36:1 (1992): 5-13, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-
number-1/pdf/v36i1a01p.pdf; Arthur S. Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer–Policy 
Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach,” Intelligence and National Security 1:2 
(1986): 212-233, doi:10.1080/02684528608431850; Sherman Kent, Strategic 
Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949); 
Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 6th ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 
2015); Steven Marrin, “At Arm's Length or at the Elbow? Explaining the Distance 
Between Analysts and Decisionmakers,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence 20:3 (2007): 401-414, doi:10.1080/08850600701249733; Joshua R. 
Rovner, “Intelligence-Policy Relations and the Problem of Politicization,” (doctoral 
dissertation, MIT, 2009), available at: http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/46633; 
Richard L. Russell, “Achieving All-Source Fusion in the Intelligence Community,” in 
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Loch K. Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2007), 
189-199; Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, National Intelligence Systems: 
Current Research and Future Prospects (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
2 Jeet Heer, “The Danger of Politicizing Intelligence,” The New Republic, December 12, 
2016, available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/139275/danger-politicizing-
intelligence.  
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be.”3 In the political area, intelligence connotes power; proximity to 
policymakers implies influence; and influence, relative to intelligence, leads to 
claims of politicization–a word with many interpretations.  
 
Most observers of US policy-making processes recognize traditional sources 
of politicization.4 Yet these are not the only potential sources.5 Individual 
citizens, organizations that provide policy research and advice (think tanks), 
the media (both traditional and new), and lobbyists contribute to politicized 
intelligence. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to examine how external 
entities contribute to the politicization of United States domestic intelligence.  
 
This article considers the history and definitions of politicization, 
distinguishes types of politicization, and analyzes three sources of 
politicization from outside the IC–think tanks, the media, and lobbyists. The 
article concludes by illuminating the outside-in aspect of politicization so 
                                                 
3 Stephen Marrin, “Revisiting Intelligence and Policy: Problems with Politicization and 
Receptivity,” Intelligence and National Security 28:1 (2013): 4, 
doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749063. 
4 Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence;” Michael I. Handel, “The Politics of Intelligence,” 
Intelligence & National Security 2:4 (1987): 5-46, doi:10.1080/02684528708431914; 
Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer;” Russell, “Achieving All-Source Fusion;” Betts and 
Mahnken, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence; Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization;” 
Kent, Strategic Intelligence; Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Stephen 
Marrin, “Rethinking Analytic Politicization,” Intelligence and National Security 28:1 
(2013), 32-54, doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749064; Rovner, “Intelligence-Policy 
Relations”; Treverton and Agrell, National Intelligence Systems. 
5 Maciej Bartkowski, “The Study of Politicization: The Case of the UN,” Rubikon (2001): 
1-11, available at: 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:xQ2ML_VjuA4J:maciejbartk
owski.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Maciej-Bartkowski.-The-Study-of-
Politicization.-The-Case-of-the-UN.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; Jonathan Craft 
and Michael Howlett, “The Dual Dynamics of Policy Advisory Systems: The Impact of 
Externalization and Politicization on Policy Advice,” Policy & Society 32:3 (2013): 187-
197, doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.07.001; Saville R. Davis, “Documentary Study of the 
Politicization of UNESCO,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 29:3 
(1975): 6-20, doi:10.2307/3824003; Cynthia R. Farina et al., “Rulemaking in 140 
Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking,” Pace 
Law Review 31:1 (2011): 382-468, available at: 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8/; Michael Howlett and Andrea 
Migone. “Searching for Substance: Externalization, Politicization and the Work of 
Canadian Policy Consultants 2006-2013,” Central European Journal of Public Policy 7:1 
(2013): 112-133, available at: http://www.cejpp.eu/index.php/ojs/article/view/143/110; 
Brandon Rottinghaus, “‘Dear Mr. President’: The Institutionalization and Politicization if 
Public Opinion Mail in the White House,” Political Science Quarterly 121:3 (2006): 451-
476, doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2006.tb00578.x; Peter W. Singer, “Washington's Think 
Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own,” The Brookings Institution, (August 12, 2010): 1-9, 
available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/08/13-think-tanks-
singer; Jose D. Villalobos and Justin S. Vaughn. “Presidential Staffing and Public 
Opinion: How Public Opinion Influences Politicization,” Administration & Society 41:4 
(2009): 449-469, doi:10.1177/0095399709334647.  
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participants and observers of the policy-making process can address this 
emerging dynamic.  
 
What is Politicization and from Where Does it Come? 
According to scholars, the first use of the word politicization was in 1907 
when Karl Lamprecht, a German historian, “spoke of die Politisizerung der 
Gesellschaft [the politicizing of society], although in the harmless sense of 
increasing interest in politics.”6 At some point between 1907 and 1919, the 
Germans began using the word politicization differently, which “rendered it 
open to alternatives and controversies and contributed to the rethinking of 
the concept of politics,” and the negative connotations with which 
politicization is associated today.7 The word politicization, a derivation of the 
word politicize dating from 1758, did not enter the English vocabulary until 
after World War I.8 
 
Despite the relatively recent origin of the word, the concept of politicization 
has been in existence since Roman times. Yakobson asserts, “all the elements 
of politicization known to us from the late [Roman] Republic feature 
prominently in the descriptions of the elections during the struggle of the 
orders.”9 In addition, during the second Punic War, according to Futrell,  
 
“Livy [Titus Livius Patavinus, the Roman historian] refers to his 
[Marcus Aemilius Lepidus’] unsuccessful candidacy for the consulship 
of 216 [BC]. This is the first known association between the giving of 
munera [gifts] and electioneering for the highest offices would 
establish a key pattern for the politicization of the gladiatorial combats 
in the later republic [Roman Republic].”10  
 
Palonen asserts, “politicization means detecting the political potential of some 
existing changes, shifts, or processes.”11 Although technically an acceptable 
definition, it results from studying the word’s changing use over time, absent 
                                                 
6 Kari Palonen, “Four Times of Politics: Policy, Polity, Politicking, and Politicization,” 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 28:2 (2003): 181, available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645073; See also Roger Chickering, Karl Lamprecht: A 
German Academic Life (1856-1915), (New Jersey: Humanities Press), 315. 
7 Ibid., 181. 
8 Ibid., 182; “Politicize,” Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=politicize&allowed_in_frame=0. 
9 Alexander Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome: A Study in the Political 
System of the Late Republic (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1999), 180. 
10 Alison Futrell, Blood in the Arena: The Spectacle of Roman Power (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 2001), 23. 
11 Palonen, “Four Times of Politics,” 182. 
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the context of its use in national security and intelligence matters or of the 
intelligence-policy relationship. In this regard, there is little definitional 
consensus amongst scholars. With the intelligence-policy context added, a 
conundrum exists with both “the definition and conceptualization of 
politicization.”12  
 
Depending on how scholars define it, there can be negative connotations as 
well as the recognition politicization may be a natural component of the 
intelligence-policy process, and therefore, useful in certain circumstances.13 
Neither the quest for a standardized definition nor the concept of 
politicization leads to definitive conclusions. Rather, the discourse revolves 
around variations upon themes, which for some authors leads to broad all-
encompassing attempts to define politicization, while for others it leads to 
defining different degrees or types of politicization, further complicating the 
concept for all actors involved. For example, Johnson defines it as “putting a 
spin on or ‘cooking’ intelligence to serve the political needs or beliefs of an 
intelligence manager or policy official.”14 Gannon contends it is “the willful 
distortion of analysis to satisfy the demands of intelligence bosses and 
policymakers.”15 Rovner defines politicization as “the attempt to manipulate 
intelligence so that it reflects policy preference.”16  
 
In contrast, Ransom cites multiple meanings including “partisan 
politicization….a point of contention between organized political parties,” 
“bipartisan politicization” that “generates public debate over ends and 
means,” and “intelligence to please,” which occurs when intelligence 
                                                 
12 Marrin, “Revisiting Intelligence and Policy,” 2. 
13 Scholars writing about negative connotations include Betts, “Politicization of 
Intelligence,” Handel, “The Politics of Intelligence,” and Kent, Strategic Intelligence. 
Scholars writing about politicization from the intelligence-policy process perspective 
include Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; Glenn Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence and 
the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience,” Intelligence and National 
Security 28:1 (2013): 5-31, doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749062; Marrin, “Rethinking 
Analytic Politicization;” Joshua R. Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” 
Intelligence and National Security 28:1 (2013): 55-67, 
doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749065, and Nathan Woodard, “Tasting the Forbidden 
Fruit: Unlocking the Potential of Positive Politicization,” Intelligence and National 
Security 28:1 (2013): 91-108, doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749066.  
14 Loch Johnson, “Bricks and mortar for a theory of intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 
22:1 (2003): 11, doi:10.1080/0149593039013048111. 
15 John C. Gannon, “Managing Analysis in the Information Age,” in Analyzing 
intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovation, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. 
Bruce (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 221. 
16 Joshua R. Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 5. 
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influences policy.17 Handel describes politicization as one of four definitions 
of the word politics, claiming it is the “interference in the intelligence process 
by leaders and their close aides.”18 However, Treverton suggests that by 
expanding the definition to include “commitments to perspectives and 
conclusions, in the process of intelligence analysis or interaction with policy, 
that suppresses other evidence or views, or blind[s] people to them.” 19 
Treverton goes on to suggest his definition resulted in five forms of 
politicization working simultaneously.20 The five forms are: 
 
• Direct pressure from senior policy officials to come to particular 
intelligence conclusions, usually ones that accord with those officials’ 
policies or policy preferences.  
• A house line on a particular subject, which shifts the focus of the bias 
from policy to intelligence. Here, a particular analytic office has a 
defined view of an issue, and analysts or analyses that suggest heresy 
are suppressed or ignored.  
• Cherry picking (and sometimes growing some cherries), in which 
senior officials, usually policy officials, pick their favorites out of a 
range of assessments.  
• Question asking, where, as in other areas of inquiry, the nature of the 
question takes the analysis a good way if not to the answer, then to the 
frame in which the answer will lie. A related version of this form 
occurs when policymakers ask a reasonable question but continue to 
ask it repeatedly, which distorts analysis—by depriving it of time and 
effort to work on other questions—even if it does not directly politicize.  
• A shared mindset, whereby intelligence and policy share strong 
presumptions. This is perhaps the limiting case; if it is politicization, it 
is more self-imposed than policymaker-imposed.  
 
Hastedt concluded, “for those who minimize its occurrence politicization 
involves the overt manipulation of intelligence and the intelligence process. 
For those who see it as a more pervasive phenomenon it can also take more 
subtle forms.”21 Finally, Marrin introduced one of the newest phrases based 
                                                 
17 Harry H. Ransom, “The Politicization of Intelligence,” in Intelligence and the 
Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society, ed. Stephen. J. Cimbala (Dobbs Ferry, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1987), 26.  
18 Handel, “The Politics of Intelligence,” 6. 
19 Gregory F. Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis: Between ‘Politicization’ and Irrelevance,” 
in Analyzing intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovation, eds. Roger Z. George and 
James B. Bruce (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 93. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Hastedt, “The Politics of Intelligence,” 5-6. 
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on the idea of “‘analytic politicization’ (a new term used to distinguish it from 
other forms of politicization).”22 Although never defined, Marrin uses the 
term to dissect various politicization definitions, summing up the definitional 
debate best by asserting, “the concept of politicization is for the most part 
analytically useless.”23 Marrin demonstrated that depending on from whose 
viewpoint–consumer or producer–one person’s definition of politicization is 
another person’s standard operating procedure for decision-making in a 
democratic society.24  
 
Types of Politicization 
In addition to seeking a definition of politicization, scholars struggle with “the 
issue of the relationship between intelligence and policy making,” and the 
question of what is the appropriate proximity between policymakers and 
analysts.25 The two theories, or schools of thought, debated in a similar 
manner to definitions are the Kent School and the Gates School.26  
 
Although Kent did not use the word politicization, he was concerned about 
the policymaker-intelligence relationship and penned one of the earliest 
articles.27 Kent contended actors must maintain a certain distance between 
one another for intelligence to provide proper guidance asserting, 
“intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans and operations to have the 
greatest amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses all its 
objectivity and integrity of judgment.”28 In contrast, Betts considered the 
academic perspective asserting, “objectivity takes precedence over 
everything,” a perspective that provided the modus operandi for the Central 
Intelligence Agency for over thirty years.29  
 
By 1980, the Gates School of thought began to emerge because of “critiques of 
ineffective intelligence contributions to policymaking, and the view that utility 
                                                 
22 Marrin, “Rethinking Analytic Politicization,” 34. 
23 Ibid., 32. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Treverton and Agrell, National Intelligence Systems, 201. 
26 Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence;” Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; Jack Davis, 
“Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis,” Kent Center Occasional 
Papers 1:5 (2002): 1-16, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-
occasional-papers/pdf/OPNo5.pdf; Russell, “Achieving All-Source Fusion;” H. Bradford 
Westerfield, “Inside Ivory Bunkers: CIA Analysts Resist Managers’ ‘Pandering’–Part II,” 
International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence 10:1 (1997), 19-54, 
doi:10.1080/08850609708435332  
27 Kent, Strategic Intelligence.  
28 Ibid., 180. 
29 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 76. 
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is the sine qua non.”30 Gates observed there were some ways in which 
politicization crept into the intelligence cycle, but said regardless of how it 
entered the intelligence cycle, both policymakers and intelligence analysts had 
to work together.31 His implication was for intelligence to be useful, and to 
provide policymakers with information necessary to make decisions 
concerning national security, sensitivity and context linked analysis and 
policy. Thus, in contrast to the Kent School, the Gates School was about the 
business of intelligence versus intelligence as an academic endeavor.  
 
Westerfield studied both schools and concluded the duality of maintaining 
both schools of thought, and hence multiple analysis perspectives, was 
perhaps a “workable–and mutually respectful–a solution for our era,” while 
acknowledging the dual theories might lead to progress but not without 
difficulty. 32 More recently, Russell, who also studied the merits of both 
schools, concluded the academic perspective perpetuated by the Kent School 
was more dangerous in terms of intelligence irrelevance than the Gates 
School. Given the changing national security needs due to the increased 
complexity from a more globally connected world in which threats come from 
nation-states and state-sponsored or independent trans-national actors, the 
job of intelligence to facilitate decision-making in the name of national 
security is more multi-faceted than perhaps either Kent or Gates realized.33 
Having evaluated the definitions and the theories, a multi-dimensional model 
of politicization emerges. It considers many angles and consists of top-down, 
bottom-up, bi-directional, and inside-out facets of politicization as described 
in Table 1.34  
 
Table 1. Types of Politicization 
Type Description 
Top-down Consumer originated. As Betts contends, it is where 
“policymakers are seen to dictate intelligence 
conclusions.”35 
                                                 
30 Ibid.  
31 Gates, “Guarding Against Politicization.”  
32 Westerfield, “Inside Ivory Bunkers,” 52. 
33 Russell, “Achieving All-Source Fusion” Kent, Strategic Intelligence; Gates, “Guarding 
Against Politicization.”  
34 Note: Bar-Joseph in “The Politicization of Intelligence” considers the top-down portion 
of the model; Betts in “Politicization of Intelligence,” contemplates the top-down, bottom-
up, and bi-directional positions, and Riste considers the inside out aspect in Olav Riste, 
“The Intelligence-Policy Maker Relationship and the Politicization of Intelligence,” in 
National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects, eds, Gregory F. 
Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 179-209.  
35 Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence,” 58. 
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Bottom-up Producer originated where “coloration of products by the 
unconscious biases of the working analysts who produce 
intelligence analyses”36 occurs, and is the opposite of top-
down. 
Bi-directional A type in which IC managers who peer review staff 
analysts’ intelligence products providing feedback to shape 
reports into finished intelligence products before 
disseminating finished intelligence to consumers.37 
Inside-out Originates from individuals working for the government 
who are not the traditional consumers and producers of 
intelligence. For example, the Office of Special Plans that 
was set up by the Department of Defense at the Pentagon 
in 2002 “whose purpose was to second guess” the civilian 
IC’s Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction intelligence 
estimate and to search for and find a link between Saddam 
Hussein and al Qaeda.38 
 
Rovner points out different that facets of politicization are accomplished 
using direct and indirect means.39 Direct means supply intelligence to please. 
Indirect means provide a source for actors to receive incentives or 
disincentives depending on the positions desired.  
 
For most of the discourse–definitions, classification, and categorization–
there has been little discussion of sources of politicization from outside the 
IC. Politicization from these sources affects both producers and consumers of 
intelligence. Consideration for outside-in politicization–the type that 
originates from outside government and the IC proper–such as from the 
media, academia, or private sector businesses is necessary for a well-rounded 
understanding of the effects that politicization has on intelligence. 
 
Analysis of Politicization External to the Intelligence 
Community 
Up until recently, the literature on politicization focused on traditional 
sources of politicization such as consumers and producers. Perhaps because 
intelligence producers primarily relied on information collected using 
                                                 
36 Betts, “Enemies of Intelligence,” 77. 
37 Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence,” 59. 
38 Riste, “The Intelligence-Policy Maker Relationship,” 181. 
39 Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever;” Joshua R. Rovner, “Intelligence in the Twitter Age,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26:2 (2013): 260-271, 
doi:10.1080/08850607.2013.757996. 
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classified methods and sources. However, with the rise of the information 
economy, both intelligence producers and consumers have instant access to 
world events. Public sentiment is also immediately available through open 
information sources such as online foreign and domestic newspapers and 
social media. All actors have easier access to professional and personal social 
networks via easy communication vehicles such as email, 24-hour news, and 
the increased use of social media feeds such as Twitter to promote issues to 
the top of public consciousness. In a democratic society, these outside stimuli 
expand horizons beyond those that traditionally informed intelligence. Three 
of the most prominent non-intelligence sources that influence and contribute 
to the politicization of intelligence are think tanks, the media, and lobbyists.  
 
Think Tank Influences 
According to Haass, “think tanks are independent institutions organized to 
conduct research and produce independent, policy relevant knowledge.”40 As 
of 2015, the number of think tank organizations swelled to over 6,840 
worldwide, including over 1,835 in the United States alone.41 The roots of 
today’s think tanks date from the 1830s when Great Britain’s Duke of 
Wellington founded the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and 
Securities Studies.42 In the United States, in 1916, Andrew Carnegie founded 
the Institute for Government Research, which eventually merged with two 
other organizations to create the Brooking Institution in 1927.43 The goal of 
these organizations was to provide dedicated, professionally trained 
researchers to study public policy and defense issues to educate and inform 
policy makers, and the public, through a variety of research products and 
channels, such as the media.  
 
Abelson asserts there are four waves, or generations he defined by time 
periods in the evolution of think tanks.44 First-generation think tanks were 
those that came into existence in the 1900s with the purpose of providing a 
forum for intellectual and scholarly debate of world issues. Second-generation 
                                                 
40 Richard N. Haass, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s 
Perspective,” in The Role of Think Tanks in U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Michael T. Scanlin, 
U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 4:3 (2002): 5. 
41 James G. McGann, 2016 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report (Philadelphia: Think 
Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania, January 26, 2017), 25-26, 
available at: 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=think_tanks.  
42 Donald D. Abelson, “Old World, New World: The Evolution and Influence of Foreign 
Affairs Think-Tanks,” International Affairs 90:1 (2014): 125-142, doi:10.1111/1468-
2346.12099.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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think tanks evolved after World War II. Third-generation think tanks took on 
an advocacy character, “combining policy research with aggressive marketing 
techniques,” effectively becoming a central actor in policy debates while 
seeking to influence “both the direction and content of foreign policy” 
garnering the attention of policymakers and the public.45 The fourth-
generation think tanks are generally new or start-up companies. Abelson 
considers this generation legacy-based because prominent policymakers, 
influential scholars, and former presidential administration staffers fund 
think tanks in an effort to leave a lasting legacy in the public policy arena.  
 
As think tanks evolved, so did the underpinning organizational structure of 
these entities. McGann developed a topology to categorize think tanks to 
expose the relative independence these organizations purport.46 The 
categories included political party affiliated, government affiliated, 
autonomous and independent, quasi-governmental, quasi-independent, and 
university affiliated.47 Each category, named based on the affiliation or 
sources of funding, contains a number of organizations, many of which now 
have globally recognizable names. For example, The Hoover Institution is 
hosted by Stanford University, the Center for Defense Information is quasi-
independent; and, the Congressional Research Service, dating from 1914, is a 
government organization.  
 
Scholarly debates about the purpose of think tanks fall across a spectrum. On 
one end are self-serving, special-interest organizations promoting a political 
agenda at the expense of the public, while on the other end think tanks are 
influential and independent forces, advocating policy research by educating 
both policymakers and the public on foreign and domestic issues.48 Those in 
the middle “sought either to maintain an image of neutrality and distance 
from policy makers or to finance themselves by producing contract research 
for the government.”49  
 
Some observers consider think tanks idea factories. This is because 
policymakers, presidents, and Congress engage these quasi-academic 
institutions to develop agendas to guide political campaigns and runs for the 
White House with thousand-page documents, which become the basis for a 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 11. 
46 McGann, 2016 Global Go to Think Tank Report, 7. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Abelson, “Old World, New World.” 
49 Andrew Rich, “The Politics of Expertise in Congress and the News Media,” Social 
Science Quarterly 82:3 (2001): 585, doi:10.1111/0038-4941.00044.  
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newly elected president and his administration’s agenda.50 For example, 
Carter, Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama “relied heavily on 
scholars from think-tanks both during elections and in the transition period 
that followed.”51 By way of example, the Heritage Foundation achieved 
notoriety in 1980 after President Reagan adopted its “‘Mandate for Change,’ 
as a blueprint for governing.”52 Singer asserted Reagan gave staffers the 
1,100-page book that provided “2,000 recommendations, [of which] roughly 
60 percent came to fruition–‘which is why Mr. Reagan’s tenure was 60 
percent successful, leading conservative William F. Buckley Jr. later 
quipped.’”53 Singer also claimed the Center for American Progress (CAP) 
published a 700-plus page book called “‘Change for America: A Progressive 
Blueprint for the 44th President’ [that] helped the Obama administration to 
jump-start its agenda as it came to Washington in early 2009, and more than 
50 staff members from CAP have since joined the administration.”54 The 
Heritage Foundation’s release of its “Blueprint for a New Administration: 
Priorities for the President” is a recent example, which illustrates the 
influence think tanks seek to exert on policy-making.55 The report provided 
recommendations and suggested actions for “15 cabinet-level departments 
and six key executive agencies” including IC elements such as the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence.56 
 
During wartime, think tanks concentrated on security policy topics using 
multiple methods for research and analysis that included consideration of 
alliances, political factors, and economic factors. Following World War II for 
example, Brookings Institution was responsible, in part, for “the creation of 
the Federal government’s budget process, civil service system, and Social 
                                                 
50 Abelson, “Old World, New World;” Haass, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy;” 
McGann, 2016 Global Go to Think Tank Report; Andrew Rich. Think Tanks, Public 
Policy, and the Politics of Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
Michael T. Scanlin, ed., “The Role of Think Tanks in U.S. Foreign Policy,” U.S. Foreign 
Policy Agenda 4:3 (2002). 
51 Abelson, “Old World, New World,” 138. 
52 Haass, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 7. 
53 Singer, “Washington's Think Tanks,” 2. 
54 Ibid. 
55 The Heritage Foundation, Blueprint for a New Administration: Priorities for the 
President (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2016). Available at: 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/BlueprintforaNewAdministration.pdf. 
56 “Blueprint for a New Administration: Priorities for the President,” The Heritage 
Foundation, November 1, 2016, available at: 
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Security; [and] the development of the Marshall plan.”57 Throughout the 
years, think tanks also provided guidance and advice to the military. For 
example, RAND developed many research products for the Army, Air Force, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the IC.58 In fact, a search of several 
think tanks’ websites revealed research projects and reports on issues 
including national security, national defense, domestic policy, and 
intelligence.59  
 
The influence think tanks have on foreign and domestic policy issues ranging 
from intelligence to social security are hard to assess. Metrics are not readily 
available, funding sources are not always transparent, and measures such as 
the number of published reports, mentions in the media, or appearances on 
television are inaccurate at best, because of easy manipulation by marketing. 
Weidenbaum suggests, “citations in the Congressional Record and in 
congressional hearings and committee reports may be more indicative of 
policy impact” than page or document counts, and media mentions.60 
Although consensus on standard measures of think tank influence may not 
yet exist, the examples previously noted are indicators that think tanks 
influence the public policy process, including intelligence.61 In addition, in a 
study Nicander conducted about the role of think tanks, “the most striking 
finding was that 94 percent of the respondents thought that think tanks [had] 
influence and an impact on decisions regarding US security policy.”62 
 
These organizations are “an important source of information to the media, the 
government, and to a host of private interest groups.”63 As such, academics 
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and observers of the policy-making process must be aware of the influence 
think tanks may have on intelligence issues, and pay attention to the bias and 
potential for the introduction of politicization into the public policy-making 
process because of the proximity and access between think tanks and 
policymakers. The marketing arms of think tanks will undoubtedly exploit 
proximity and access to policy makers to the media to influence popular 
opinion.  
 
Media Influences 
For actors seeking to politicize intelligence, the press and other news media 
outlets had been the traditional communication channels used for 
information dissemination. As far back as World War II, media outlets, such 
as the BBC, were not only a source of intelligence, but also a vehicle for 
politicization, spreading the word policymakers desired the public to hear 
about war progress.64 In the United States, prior to 1980, Americans learned 
of political events and policy through print media or via traditional over-the-
air broadcast television networks such as ABC’s ,CBS’s, and NBC’s nightly 
news programs. The stories broadcast by these network stations were tightly 
controlled and worded such that the content and the message were politically 
correct. More importantly, the stories were mostly consistent with the sitting 
presidential administration’s public policy.65 All this changed when, in 1980, 
Cable News Network, an all-news channel burst onto the scene, broadcasting 
news 24 hours a day. Since then, politicized reporting of public policy was 
thrust onto audiences as pundits and commentators–whether conservative or 
liberal–opined and changed the course of the American political landscape.  
 
In addition to traditional sources such as print media, broadcast, and cable 
news, the information technology revolution, beginning in the 1990s, also 
became an outlet for politicized intelligence. According to Denécé, “about 10 
million Web pages are created every day, and the total volume doubles every 
four years.”66 As the frequency and quantity of media reports increase, many 
sources and channels provide commentary and assessments, which appear 
more like opinion than the product of credible research or analysis. 
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66 Eric Denécé, “The Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: 1989–2003,” International 
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27:1 (2014): 34, 
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Intelligence also faces new challenges from new sources such as social media, 
an increasingly popular and easily accessible information channel available to 
anyone with Internet access, including policymakers. With the ability to 
leverage real-time reports from a variety of social media networks, 
policymakers have instant access to information. The result has been news 
media “rais[ing] questions about its [the IC’s] ability to provide policymakers 
anything useful beyond what the new media provide.”67  
 
Further complicating matters, social media companies such as Twitter, 
Facebook Instagram, Reddit, YouTube, LinkedIn, SnapChat, and Pinterest 
provide channels where readily accessible information is available to 
policymakers who are becoming “less dependent on intelligence agencies for 
updates on current events.”68 For the IC, this is a problem because the 
window of opportunity in which policy makers consume information is 
shrinking, leaving little time for the IC to perform its value-added analyses 
and produce judgments. The volume of available information is an 
opportunity for policymakers to cherry pick information to support or refute a 
political position, and the information from which the policymaker can select 
is virtually unlimited. This increases pressure on the IC to add value to the 
volume of open source information, and the increased pressure may push 
some IC leaders to manipulate intelligence to appease policymakers to curb 
skepticism about the value of the IC. According to Rovner, “in addition, they 
[IC leaders] might also become willing to deliver intelligence to please to stay 
in the good graces of policymakers. Politicization will be more likely in this 
scenario.”69  
 
Media outlets are a challenge for the IC, which must maintain secrecy while 
simultaneously educating the public and policymakers about national security 
threats. With the seemingly unlimited amounts of information available, and 
the number of professional and armchair journalists, so-called news and 
information pertaining to national security found on traditional media outlets 
and social media channels may be misleading, biased, wrong, fake, or 
intentionally politicized to appeal to the hearts and minds of the public that 
any actor may strive to influence. For intelligence, “citizens use blogs, journal 
comments, radio, and TV question and answer (Q&A) sessions to inquire 
about, comment on, discuss debate, criticize, or favor intelligence issues and 
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developments.”70 This type of communication not only decreases the 
proximity to policymakers but also influences their thinking. It also leads to 
“‘opinion journalism,’ whereby journalists provide their personal opinions, 
sometimes highly biased and speculative, on a specific issue rather than 
reporting the facts.”71  
 
Before new media burst onto the scene, the IC had time to vet open source 
information and fuse it with secret information to differentiate the signals 
from within the noise, rendering intelligence policymakers used for decision-
making. Today, the politicization of intelligence through traditional media 
outlets and social media sources is as simple as influencing political leaders 
through blog posts, Twitter feeds, and YouTube videos that broadcast 
instantly and “have a major impact on political decision-makers and the 
public sphere.”72 The relationship intelligence has with the media is “tense but 
symbiotic” because “the intelligence sector needs media to tell some of its 
story, while the media need intelligence to get an exciting story.”73 Although 
Johnson’s assessment of intelligence failures and scandals was not about the 
politicization of intelligence, he correlated a relationship between media 
coverage and intelligence oversight levels.74 He explained the influence the 
media puts on policymakers when he asserted, “extensive media coverage of 
intelligence seemed to stir interest in a topic amongst executive and legislative 
officials.”75 In addition, other intelligence practitioners, academicians, and 
government and journalism experts concur, intelligence and the media have a 
complex bi-directional relationship.76 The same holds true for intelligence 
lobbyists and policymakers. 
 
Lobbyist Influences 
According to the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), an independent, non-
partisan, non-profit organization that monitors the money spent on US 
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politics and its effect on public policy, influence is the primary purpose for 
money flowing through the US political system. The CRP asserts, 
“corporations and industry groups, labor unions, single-issue organizations–
together, they spend billions of dollars each year to gain access to decision-
makers in government, all in an attempt to influence their thinking,” and their 
votes.77 Lobbyists influence public policy across a wide spectrum of topics. 
Section 6 of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), requires lobbyists to 
register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives based on certain spending thresholds (set for four-year 
periods) as determined by the Secretary of Labor. According to the LDA 
Guidance website, “after January 1, 2013, an organization employing in-house 
lobbyists is exempt from registration if its total expenses for lobbying 
activities does not exceed and is not expected to exceed $12,500 during a 
quarterly period,” otherwise the lobbyist must register.78 In addition, the LDA 
requires active lobbyists to file quarterly activity reports.79  
 
Information from the filed reports is freely available to the public. To make 
analysis of lobbying efforts more transparent and easier for the public to 
understand, the CRP compiles the data and makes it available on its website 
for anyone to search. For example, as of October 28, 2016, 10,882 lobbyists 
spent $2.63 billion to influence policymakers’ decisions.80  
 
In particular, lobbyists focused most of their efforts on both houses of 
Congress responsible for yearly budget appropriations amongst other items 
(see Figure 1). Since intelligence as a policy issue falls under the purview of 
several IC elements, lobbyists also spent time courting policymakers and 
staffers in those respective organizations. In addition, lobbyists also rallied 
around intelligence as an issue and found a number of opportunities in which 
to exert influence.  
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Figure 1. Lobbying. Number of clients and reports filed by 
government agency, department, or issue. 
 
Source: The Center for Responsive Politics, January 18, 2017, available at: 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/search.php.  
Notes: Client is the organization that paid for the lobbying. Graphic created by 
author using data from The Center for Responsive Politics, current as of October 
28, 2016.81 
 
In 2016, businesses lobbied Congress for intelligence spending so those 
businesses could compete for services contracts such as for computer system 
implementation and integration or advocate agendas related to intelligence 
                                                 
81 The author created this graphic using the data as coded and categorized by the CRP. 
According to the CRP, lobbyists report activities on the LD-2 Disclosure forms under one 
of 80 issue areas. The author relied on the CPR to code issues properly. The CRP also 
makes individual reports filed available to the public via its website. To confirm coding 
for intelligence issues, the author inspected a random sample of reports from the 
elements in Figure 1, searching through disclosure forms looking specifically at the 
category Intelligence (as an issue) and the code “INT” to validate lobbying for intelligence 
related topics. Random samples of disclosure forms for other categories also revealed the 
“INT” coding. While it is difficult to ascertain the topic of discussions lobbyists conducted 
with respective parties without having been present at the meetings, the number of 
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issues such as freedom of speech, surveillance, cybersecurity, encryption, and 
sharing of cybersecurity information. For example, according to the CRP, 
companies lobbying for intelligence specific issues included Microsoft 
Corporation, Facebook Inc., Intel Corp, SoftBank Corp., Citigroup Inc., 
Consumer Technology Association, Twitter, Verizon Communications, Yahoo! 
Inc., and Zebra Technologies, amongst others.82 In addition, the CRP data 
show lobbyists reaching out to policymakers on intelligence issues such as the 
FY 17 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congressional bills such as H.R. 1037, 
Global Free Internet Act of 2015, H.R. 1466, The Surveillance State Repeal 
Act, S. 754, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, cybersecurity and 
encryption technology, and reform issues pertaining to the Electronic 
Computer Privacy Act.83  
 
McKay conducted a study and tested common assumptions about spending 
related to policymaking by combining new and existing information from a 
prior survey of lobbyists, which according to her, was “the largest sample of 
lobbyists ever interviewed by scholars–the Washington Representatives study 
by Heinz et al. (1990, 1993).”84 Although McKay’s analysis was not specific to 
intelligence, “the data suggest[ed] that money alone does not buy success, but 
how it is spent may matter.”85 Whether lobbyists are successful in their 
endeavors specific to intelligence related matters is an outstanding question 
worthy of further research. The United States IC, administration officials, and 
observers of the policy-making process should not only be aware of the vast 
market related to intelligence lobbying, but also how these lobbyists are 
proactively guarding against possible politicization attempts or actively 
pursuing one side of an issue.  
 
Conclusion 
Ransom observed politicization is tied to behaviors such that when 
“consensus wars” existed, politicization is absent because of “policy 
neutrality.”86 Yet, when political actors’ opinions differ, “the intelligence 
system tends to become politicized.”87 Handel’s first paradox states, “on the 
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one hand, it is the democracy and the struggle for influence over public 
opinion that increases politicization of intelligence, but on the other hand it is 
democratic pressure that contains and limits that politicization.”88 In 
addition, Handel recognized controlling and opposing political parties might 
become so embroiled in debates that one way to force resolution was to 
“market intelligence conclusions…[by taking] them to the media, seeking 
public opinion in support of policy.”89 Handel was also one of the first 
scholars to point out “yet another intelligence paradox; namely, that the best 
professionals are the amateurs.”90 Perhaps he recognized the potential of 
politicization by non-intelligence actors.  
 
Politicization is as old as the intelligence business.91 It is a continuum and, 
depending on its use, can have many definitions. Definitions create subtleties 
and nuances that in certain cases may render politicization a normal part of 
the political process. Betts concluded “to some degree [politicization is] 
inevitable, and, in some forms, necessary” and asserted the “paradox…is that 
the real world of policy makes politicization in one form the worst thing that 
can happen to intelligence, but, in another form, the best.”92 Politicization is 
similar to the saying about terrorism, where one man’s terrorist is another’s 
freedom fighter. It “exists in the eye of the beholder, and more specifically, 
the beholder whose political frame of reference differs from the implications 
of the analysis beheld.”93  
 
Think tanks are a necessary part of the policy-making process because these 
organizations augment the capabilities of both the producers and consumers 
of intelligence. At the same time, all parties must recognize the potential 
influence and biases these organizations can introduce into the intelligence 
process. Traditional media had a carefully curated and influential effect on 
the policy-making process. That changed with the proliferation of 
communication sources in the Internet age. Instant access to information that 
is always flowing may influence policy-makers’ thinking without the benefit of 
the value-added and synthesized analyses producers provide to the 
intelligence process. Lobbyists influence public policy across a wide spectrum 
of topics. Both producers and consumers of intelligence should become more 
familiar with the intelligence-related topics and the vast sums of money spent 
to guard against politicization. Each of these outside-in aspects of 
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politicization has the potential to affect policy-making and the strategic 
intelligence process. 
 
Intelligence will never be completely free from politics or from the effects of 
politicization. Both the IC and policymakers must realize in the Information 
Age, debates will naturally occur in the public’s view and are increasingly 
likely to include a more engaged, but possibly more divided, public due to 
increased virtual proximity afforded by social media. The secrecy that 
intelligence once enjoyed has transformed into a more open dialogue about 
national security. The proximity of the public to policymakers and intelligence 
leaders is closer than before, if only virtually, enabled by technology. The 
knowledge that was once difficult to obtain is now more accessible, causing 
the IC to work harder to add value and compete for policymakers’ attention. 
Unfortunately, debate that is more public will increase opportunities for 
politicization. Hence, all parties must be aware of the outside-in aspect of 
politicization and its effects on policy-making and the strategic intelligence 
process. 
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